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1 Introduction
Two salient features of international labor mobility are that high-skilled people exhibit much
greater propensity to emigrate than the less educated, and tend to agglomerate in countries
with high rewards to skill (Grogger and Hanson, 2011; Docquier and Rapoport, 2012). Pos-
itive selection is due to migrants’ self-selection (high-skilled people being more responsive
to economic opportunities and political conditions abroad, having more transferable skills,
having greater ability to gather information or finance emigration costs, etc.), and to the
skill-selective immigration policies conducted in the major destination countries. The global
competition to attract talents is tough because inflows of high-skilled workers make immigra-
tion not only economically more advantageous, but also politically acceptable in destination
countries. The reasons are that high-skilled workers bring valuable knowledge which is key
to stimulate productivity levels and growth (Peri et al., 2013; Peri, 2012), do not compete
with nationals for the welfare state and other public services (Chojnicki, 2011), integrate
faster in the labor market (Miller and Neo, 1997; Amuedo-Dorantes and de la Rica, 2007)
and assimilate better in the society (Dustmann, 1996; de Palo et al., 2006). So far, the US
has been leading the race, attracting PhD candidates and graduates not only from emerg-
ing countries, but also from the fifteen members of the European Union (EU15) and other
industrialized countries.
There are good reasons to believe that the race to attract talents will get tougher in the
coming decades. Intensification will be due to skill-biased technical changes and growing
specialization of developed countries in skill-intensive activities, short supply of knowledge
and entrepreneurial skills (translating into greater returns to skill and income inequality),
aging and the resulting pressure on the welfare states. A growing number of countries have
already adopted immigration policies specifically aimed at selecting and attracting high-
skilled workers (see Boeri et al., 2012). Examples are the recent introduction of a points-
based system in the UK (the Swiss, Dutch and German governments are considering the
same option), the new immigration act of 2005 in Germany, the adoption of the EU blue
card and the increase in the number of H1B visas in the US. This paper investigates the
effects of an increased competition to attract talents on the world economy. We assess its
impact on the worldwide supply of human capital and its geographic distribution. We also
quantify the short- and long-run impacts on the worldwide average level of income per capita
and income inequality are analyzed.
In Section 2, we combine bilateral data on effective and desiring migrants by education
level. Effective migrants are those who have already migrated. Desiring migrants are those
who have not yet migrated but express the willingness to do so. Adding effective and desiring
2
migrants gives the number of potential migrants. For each country pair, we define the Net
Pool of Foreign Talents (NPFT) as the difference between potential entries and potential
exits of college-educated workers (i.e. potential immigrants minus potential emigrants). The
NPFT is computed at the current economic conditions and can be positive or negative.
Expressed as percentage of the college-educated native labor force, the relative NPFT is
considered as a measure of the country’s attractiveness for human capital. We compute
the (absolute and relative) NPFT of selected high-income countries. We show that the
EU15 has a large NPFT, although this pool is relatively smaller than the US or Canadian
ones. This reflects the fact that Europe is economically less attractive than the US for the
highly educated (due to lower skill premium, higher tax rates, etc.). So far, the EU15 has
poorly benefited from its NPFT, partly because European immigration policies have been
less selective. On the contrary, the US has mobilized a large portion of it.
We then use a micro-founded model to simulate the effects of a worldwide liberalization of
high-skilled migration, also referred to as an increased competition to attract talents hence-
forth. Section 3 provides a non-technical description of the model. The model accounts for
the key interactions between human capital accumulation and migration. In particular, the
increased competition for attracting talents affects the returns to schooling and education de-
cisions in the world by changing expectations about future migration opportunities. This link
between emigration prospects and human capital formation has been identified in the recent
literature. Identification strategies rely on survey data on the student population1, regional
heterogeneity in emigration and education patterns2, quasi-natural emigration shocks3, or
cross-country regressions. All these studies concur that education decisions are closely con-
nected with the intensity of skill-selection in emigration.4 Our model is parametrized to
match the characteristics of the world economy in the year 2000 and to be compatible with
official demographic forecasts.
Short-run and long-run effects of various liberalization experiments are presented in Sec-
tion 4. Overall, a worldwide liberalization of high-skilled migration benefits high-income
countries and adversely affects developing countries. It reduces the average income gap be-
tween the EU15 and the US. However, the European gains are unevenly distributed: less
attractive countries (i.e. countries with smaller relative NPFT) such as Austria, Belgium,
Germany, Greece, Luxembourg and the Netherlands benefit less than the US, Canada or
1See Gibson and McKenzie (2011) on Tonga and Papua New Guinea or Kangasniemi et al. (2007) on
medical doctors in the UK.
2See Batista et al. (2012) on Cape Verde, McKenzie and Rapoport (2011) on Mexico, or Ha et al. (2009)
on China.
3See Chand and Clemens (2008) on Fiji, Shrestha (2013) on Nepal, or Vasilakis (2014) on European
football.
4See Beine et al. (2008), Docquier et al. (2008), Easterly and Nyarko (2009), or Beine et al. (2011).
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Australia. In developing countries, skill-biased emigration prospects stimulate investments
in higher education. However, this incentive mechanism is too small to induce a net brain
gain. Hence, human capital and income per worker decrease in poor countries. Emigrants
are the main beneficiaries of a liberalization policy as shown by a rise in the income per
natural in developing regions. Thus, the emigrants’ income gains exceed the losses for those
left behind in poor countries. Increasing the race to attract talents increases inequality in
economic performance, especially if total factor productivity varies with human capital.
2 Potential migration of college graduates
There are several databases documenting the size and structure of effective migration stocks
by education level, country of birth and country of destination. In the last decade, there
were 111.6 million adult migrants in the world. This included 26 million of college graduates,
a vast majority of whom were residing in rich countries (see Artuç et al., 2014). Table 1
documents net immigration stocks (i.e. entries minus exits) of college graduates in EU15
countries, the US, Australia and Canada. They include intra-EU movements, although the
latter cancel out at the aggregate EU15 level.
The first two columns of Table 1 show that migration increased the number of college
graduates in the United States (+11.6 percent), Canada (+25.8 percent) and Australia
(+51.9 percent) in the last decade. On the contrary, the EU15 attracted fewer college-
educated immigrants and was unable to retain its own talents. The EU15 exhibited a net
deficit of 0.571 million workers, representing 1.0 percent of the college-educated labor force
born in Europe. In relative terms, the largest losses were observed in Ireland (-20.8 percent),
Portugal (-12.7 percent) and Greece (-8.9 percent). On the contrary, net inflows of college
graduates were observed in Luxembourg (+19.8 percent), Sweden (+6.8 percent) and the
Netherlands (+4.9 percent).
In parallel, the unique and largely understudied Gallup database identifies the proportion
and the characteristics of people who had not yet migrated and expressed a desire to leave
their country of birth in the last decade. Around 274.5 million adult workers wanted to
leave their country permanently if they were given the opportunity, including 68.1 million
college graduates. There are good reasons to believe that "having the opportunity" has not
been closely interpreted as "being granted a visa" by many respondents (see Docquier et al.,
2014b). However, we consider the desired migration stocks, taken at face value, as upper-
bounds of the demographic shock that a complete liberalization of high-skilled migration
could induce. Columns 3 and 4 in Table 1 show that letting all desiring migrants emigrate
would have attenuated human capital disparities between the EU15 and the US in the
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2000’s, increasing the number of college graduates by 10.2 percent in Europe and 6.2 percent
in the US. Net desired migration is positive in the vast majority of high-income countries,
implying that the stock of desiring college-educated immigrants exceeds the stock of desiring
emigrants. An exception in our sample is Luxembourg, which is rarely reported as a preferred
destination by desiring migrants in the Gallup database. In relative terms, the preferred
EU15 destinations are Scandinavian countries, Spain, Ireland and France. On the contrary,
net desired migration is lower in countries such as Germany, Italy, Belgium or Portugal.
These countries either attract fewer desiring immigrants or have more desiring emigrants.
Larger levels are obtained for Canada (57.5 percent) and Australia (123.1 percent).
Potential migration is the sum of effective and desiring migrants. Adding up the net stocks
of effective and desiring migrants, we identify the Net Pool of Foreign Talents (NPFT) of each
country. The NPFT is defined as the difference between potential entries and potential exits
of college-educated workers (see column 5). We use it as a proxy for the partial-equilibrium
change in human capital that would be induced by a worldwide, skill-selective liberalization
of labor mobility. The NPFT is positive in the majority of high-income countries, imply-
ing that the stock of potential college-educated immigrants exceeds the stock of potential
emigrants. Dividing the NPFT by the college-educated, native-born labor force, we obtain
the relative NPFT and consider it as a measure of the country’s attractiveness for human
capital. Columns 5 and 6 in Table 1 show that overall, the EU15 is less attractive than the
United States, and much less than Canada and Australia. Compared to the autarkic (no-
migration) situation, letting all potential high-skilled migrants move would have increased
the college-educated workforce by 17.8 percent in the US and by 9.3 percent in the EU15
in the last decade. However, the EU15 has not yet mobilized its potential pool of talents,
contrary to the US which has attracted about two thirds of it.
5
Table 1: Net immigration stocks and NPFT in selected countries (2000’s)
Net effective migration Net desired migration Net Pool of Foreign Talents
Country Absolute Relative Absolute Relative Absolute Relative
Austria -40,528 -3.1% 128,646 +9.8% 88,117 +6.7%
Belgium 50,720 +2.6% 48,112 +2.5% 98,831 +5.1%
Denmark -31,649 -3.8% 111,272 +13.3% 79,623 +9.5%
Finland -54,206 -5.5% 218,774 +22.0% 164,568 +16.6%
France 232,408 +2.5% 1,157,422 +12.2% 1,389,830 +14.7%
Germany -32,884 -0.2% 856,931 +5.6% 824,047 +5.3%
Greece -113,817 -8.9% 120,153 +9.4% 6,336 +0.5%
Ireland -120,321 -20.8% 80,386 +13.9% -39,935 -6.9%
Italy -289,039 -3.6% 529,638 +6.6% 240,599 +3.0%
Luxembourg 13,746 +19.8% -2,531 -3.7% 11,215 +16.2%
Netherlands 114,907 +4.9% 180,212 +7.8% 295,119 +12.7%
Portugal -132,344 -12.7% 50,891 +4.9% -81,453 -7.8%
Spain 101,970 +2.4% 1,118,610 +26.1% 1,220,581 +28.5%
Sweden 108,164 +6.8% 484,657 +30.3% 592,821 +37.0%
UK -378,139 -4.5% 807,729 +9.7% 429,590 +5.1%
Total EU15 -571,011 -1.0% 5,890,901 +10.2% 5,319,890 +9.3%
Australia 1,440,055 +51.9% 3,415,750 +123.1% 4,855,805 +175.0%
Canada 2,182,516 +25.8% 4,870,447 +57.5% 7,052,963 +83.3%
USA 9,784,006 +11.6% 5,227,830 +6.2% 15,011,836 +17.8%
Total 18 12,835,556 +8.4% 19,404,928 +12.7% 32,240,493 +21.0%
Notes: ‘Net effective migration’ = Effective entries minus exits of college graduates, based on the 2000
migration stock data of Artuç et al. (2014). ‘Net desired migration’ = Desired entries minus exits of college
graduates, based on the desired migration stock data of Docquier et al. (2014a). ‘Net Pool of Foreign
Talents’ = Difference between potential (i.e. effective plus desired) entries and exits of college-educated
workers. Absolute measures are net stocks of individuals aged 25 and over. Relative measures are expressed
as percentage of the native-born, college-educated population aged 25 and over.
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3 A world economy model
To predict the effects of an intensification of the race for attracting talents on the world
economy, we use a model that accounts for the behavioral and technological responses to
migration policy reforms. Our model encompasses three channels of transmission of migra-
tion shocks. First, as stated above, skill-biased changes in emigration prospects stimulate
people to acquire tertiary education. This mechanism will be referred to as the incentive
effect henceforth. The literature has shown that it is important in middle-income and poor
countries where tertiary education is perceived as increasing the probability to get a visa.
Second, newly educated individuals left behind as well as new migrants moving from poor
countries (where the access to and quality of the education system are low) to rich countries
(where the access and quality are high) change their fertility and their investment in the
basic education (primary and secondary levels) of their offspring. This mechanism will be
referred to as the access-to-education effect. Finally, movements of human capital can affect
cross-country disparities in total factor productivity and wages through the technology effect.
Quantitative theory (i.e. properly parametrized, micro-founded, general equilibrium models)
is an ideal tool to formalize the above-mentioned mechanisms and to predict the effects of
skill-selective liberalization shocks on human capital formation, geographic concentration of
college-educated workers and the world distribution of income.
We provide here a non-technical description of the model; more details can be found in the
Online Appendix or in Docquier et al. (2014a) and Delogu et al. (2013). Our model assumes
two-period lived agents (adults and children) and K countries (k = 1, ..., K). Adults are the
only decision makers. They maximize their well-being and decide where to live, whether to
invest in their own (higher) education, how much to consume, and how much to invest in
the quantity and quality (i.e. basic education) of their children. We distinguish between
college-educated adults and the less educated (s = h, l) and assume that preferences are
represented by a two-level nested utility function.
The outer utility function has a deterministic and a random component. The utility for
a type-s individual moving from country k to country i at time t can be written as:
U ski,t = ln vsi,t + ln(1− xski,t) + ln(1− esk) + εski
where ln vsi,t is the deterministic utility in destination i, and xski,t is the effort required to
migrate from country k to country i. Individuals are heterogeneous in their ability to acquire
higher education and in their preference for alternative locations. The individual-specific
level of effort required to be of type s = (h, l) in country k is denoted by esk. We have elk = 0
for those who do not invest in higher education. For those who decide to invest, we assume
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that ehk follows a Pareto distribution. Basic education is a prerequisite to invest in higher
education. The individual-specific random taste shock for moving from country k to i is
denoted by εski and follows a Type-I extreme value distribution. Although εski and esk are
individual-specific, we omit individual subscripts for notational convenience.
The timing of decision is such that individuals decide whether to acquire higher education
or not before discovering their migration taste. They educate if the expected benefits from
college education exceed the training effort. Hence, global changes in migration policies (such
as a skill-selective decrease in visa costs) affect the expected benefits from higher education
and stimulate human capital formation. This formalizes the incentive effect. After education,
each individual discovers her migration type and decides whether to remain in her country
of birth or emigrate to another destination.
The (after-migration) inner utility function vsi,t is a Cobb-Douglas function of consump-
tion (csi,t), fertility (nsi,t) and the proportion of children receiving basic education (qsi,t). In
logs, we have:
ln vsk,t = (1− θ) ln csk,t + θ lnnsk,t + θλ ln qsk,t
where (θ, λ) are preference parameters.
Individuals maximize this function subject to a standard budget constraint that ac-
counts for the time cost to raise children, basic education costs and child labor. When
within-country wage ratios between workers and education costs (expressed as percentage of
high-skilled wages) are constant, optimal fertility rates and basic education investments are
exogenous. Only adults who received basic education when they were young can invest in
higher education. This formalizes the access-to-education effect. When deciding to emigrate
or stay in their home country, individuals anticipate the optimal level of utility attainable in
all the possible destinations. Hence, destination choices are governed by differences in income
and public provision and quality of basic education.
Finally, education and migration decisions affect the size and the structure of the labor
force in all the countries. In the benchmark model, we assume that wages are not affected by
migration shocks (partial equilibrium). We also consider a variant of the model in which total
factor productivity (TFP henceforth) is an increasing and concave function of the proportion
of college graduates in the labor force (with an elasticity equal to 0.32), as in Delogu et al.
(2013). This formalizes the technology effect.5
Our model is calibrated to match the characteristics of the world economy in the year
5Note that this variant still implies a constant wage ratio between college graduates and less educated
workers. In Delogu et al. (2013), we relaxed this assumption and assumed that the production function has
a constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) form. When the parameters of the CES function are properly
calibrated, endogenizing wage inequality has a minor effect on the results.
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2000 and to be compatible with official demographic projections for the period 2000-2075.
One period represents 25 years. Country-specific, technological parameters are chosen to
perfectly fit the world distribution of income, i.e. cross-country disparities in GDP per
capita and within-country income differences between college graduates and the less edu-
cated. In the partial equilibrium model, total factor productivity grows at the same rate in
all the countries (+1.5 percent per year).6 Parameters of the distribution of education costs
are such that we perfectly match data on the skill composition of the native and resident
working-age populations. Total migration costs are calibrated as residuals of the “migration
technology” so as to match the observed size and structure of each migration corridor. Using
the same technique, legal/visa migration costs are identified so as to match the data on po-
tential migration described in Table 1. These migration costs are treated as exogenous and
assumed to be time-invariant. Other preference parameters are in line with the empirical
literature. They are chosen so as to match the empirically estimated levels of the elasticity of
migration to income and the average elasticity of college-education investment to high-skilled
emigration prospects. Finally, the time-path of exogenous variables is calibrated to fit the
official population projections of the United Nations for the 21st century.
Inevitably, such a stylized model omits several important features of the real world (trade,
unemployment, redistribution, network externalities, etc.) and badly accounts for the emer-
gence of some developing countries or the effect of the recent economic crisis. However, it
accounts for the long-run interactions between human capital accumulation, migration and
growth. We believe such a quantitative theory framework is an appropriate tool to predict
the medium- and long-run impacts of migration policy reforms.
4 Quantitative analysis
We simulate the effects of a complete removal of legal/visa migration costs for college grad-
uates (but not for the less educated). This is equivalent to implementing a points-based
system, granting a permanent visa to each applicant with at least one year of college edu-
cation. We consider a global shock (i.e. applied worldwide to all the countries) or regional
shocks (i.e. liberalization of high-skilled migration to a particular region). We assume the
shock occurs in 2025 and is permanent. Implications for high-income countries are discussed
6Assuming convergence in TFP or higher growth rates in large emerging countries (such as China or
India) would reduce the NPFT of current industrialized countries. Gallup data reveal that China and India
are not very attractive despite their growth potential: immigration rates would increase from 0.1 to 0.3
percent in China and from 1.1 to 1.5 percent in India if all desiring migrants were allowed to move. However,
China and India account for roughly 8.9 percent of the worldwide stock of college-educated emigrants, and
11 percent of the stock of desiring emigrants. Higher growth rates in these two countries could reduce the
number of desiring emigrants to the main destination countries.
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in Section 4.1. Section 4.2 presents the effect on income per worker and income per natural
in developing countries. Finally, Section 4.3 discusses the effects on the world distribution of
income.
4.1 Race for talents and economic leadership
We first investigate the effects of skill-selective liberalization shocks on income per worker
in selected high-income countries. Results are presented in Table 2. Three numerical experi-
ments are conducted in this section: a complete removal of legal/visa migration restrictions
for college graduates in the EU15 alone (this scenario is labeled as ‘EU15’ in column 1), in
the United States alone (labeled as ‘USA’ in column 2), or in all the countries of the world
(labeled as ‘Global’). For the first two shocks, we only discuss the effects observed after
50 years. For the global liberalization shock, we compare the short-run (in column 3) and
long-run effects (in column 4). Our benchmark model assumes exogenous wage rates but for
the global shock, we also provide results obtained with endogenous TFP (in columns 5 and
6) and identify the technology effect.
If the EU15 liberalizes high-skilled immigration alone (column 1), its average income
per worker increases by 12.6 percent. This long-run effect accounts for the changes in mi-
gration, education and fertility in all the countries of the world. Countries benefiting the
most (i.e. more than 10 percent) are the United Kingdom, Ireland, Scandinavian countries,
France, Spain and Portugal. The smallest effects are observed in Austria, Belgium, Ger-
many, Greece, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. Gallup data on desired migration reveal
that these countries have smaller NPFT. It is worth noticing that income per worker de-
creases by 1.2 percent in the US and 1.5 percent in Canada. This is due to the fact that
Europe would attract some college-educated Americans and other migrants who would have
emigrated to North America otherwise.
If the US liberalizes alone (column 2), its average income per worker increases by 9.0
percent in the long-run. This effect is smaller than in the EU15 case because the US have
already mobilized a larger portion of its NPFT. Income per worker decreases by 1.7 percent
in Canada and 0.8 percent in Australia and the EU15. Countries suffering the most in the
EU15 are English speaking countries (-1.4 percent in the United Kingdom and -1.3 percent
in Ireland) but also Portugal (-1.7 percent), Italy (-1.1 percent) and France (-1.0 percent).
The latter countries suffer from an increased brain drain to the US. It is worth noticing
that the Gallup database only documents the preferred destination of desiring migrants
and does not permit to identify closer substitutes among destinations. Having data on
the n preferred destinations would have allowed us to refine the assessment of the negative
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externality induced by a regional liberalization on the other regions.
Table 2: Effect of skill-selective liberalization on income per worker
Shock EU15 USA Global Global - Endog. TFP
Long-run Long-run Short-run Long-run Short-run Long-run
Austria +6.1 -0.3 +3.7 +4.7 +7.5 +9.4
Belgium +6.9 -0.3 +2.2 +4.4 +3.6 +7.7
Denmark +13.3 -0.9 +6.4 +9.9 +13.3 +18.7
Finland +19.3 -0.7 +12.5 +17.4 +20.4 +25.9
France +13.5 -1.0 +6.1 +9.1 +11.3 +16.6
Germany +7.3 -0.4 +3.1 +4.3 +6.2 +8.5
Greece +7.2 -0.5 +3.0 +5.1 +7.2 +10.7
Ireland +16.5 -1.3 +7.3 +12.7 +13.6 +21.2
Italy +9.8 -1.1 +3.0 +6.6 +5.8 +12.0
Luxembourg +6.6 -0.7 -0.3 +2.5 -1.3 +3.7
Netherlands +6.6 -0.7 +3.0 +3.3 +6.4 +6.3
Portugal +17.3 -1.7 +3.0 +10.6 +5.4 +18.9
Spain +17.8 -0.4 +8.3 +13.5 +19.1 +27.4
Sweden +17.0 -0.8 +13.3 +14.2 +25.2 +24.7
United Kingdom +20.9 -1.4 +8.1 +15.1 +18.3 +29.2
Average EU15 +12.6 -0.8 +5.3 +8.8 +11.0 +16.6
Australia 0.0 -0.8 +33.3 +15.8 +57.2 +22.9
Canada -1.5 -1.7 +31.1 +16.0 +42.8 +20.2
United States -1.2 9.0 +5.7 +5.9 +7.6 +7.5
Average 18 4.6 4.1 +7.5 +7.8 +12.1 +12.3
Notes: Effects of eliminating visa costs for college graduates on income per worker as percentage of deviation
from the benchmark. Short-run: effect in 2025. Long-run: effect in 2075. Endogenous TFP: elasticity of
TFP and wages to the proportion of college graduates equal to .32.
Columns 3 and 4 give the short-run and long-run impacts of a worldwide liberalization
shock in the benchmark, partial equilibrium model. We find that a complete liberalization of
high-skilled migration would benefit more the EU15 (+8.8 percent) than the United States
(+5.9 percent) in the long-run. However, in line with desired migration numbers provided in
Table 1, the greatest responses are observed for Canada (+16.0 percent) and Australia (+15.8
percent). Gains among European countries are unevenly distributed. They would be smaller
than the US gains in some countries (Austria, Belgium, Germany, Greece, Luxembourg and
the Netherlands) and much greater in others (Scandinavian countries, the UK, Ireland,
Portugal and Spain). Short-run gains are smaller than the long-run ones. The reason is
that a skill-selective liberalization stimulates basic education and gradually increases the
worldwide stock of college-educated workers, due to the access-to-education effect.
Columns 5 and 6 show that the scale of the effects increases under endogenous TFP.
The difference between the EU15 and the US becomes even larger in the long-run (+16.6
11
percent in the EU15 vs +7.5 percent in the US). There are two reasons for this. First,
endogenizing TFP amplifies the human capital shock, the latter being greater in the EU15
than in the US in line with Table 1. Second, our specification with endogenous TFP assumes
a concave relationship between the TFP level and the proportion of college graduates in
the labor force (with an elasticity equal to 0.32). As the EU15 starts with a lower level of
human capital, the marginal TFP response to the shock is greater than in the US. Still, a
complete liberalization of mobility would have a limited impact on the economic disparities
across industrialized countries. The average income per worker in the US currently exceeds
the average European level by about 60 percent. Even with endogenous TFP, only a limited
portion of this gap (about 9 percentage points) would be curbed if the EU15 and the US
mobilized their entire net pool of foreign talents.
4.2 Effect on developing countries
We now investigate the implications of a global liberalization of high-skilled migration for
developing countries. Column 1 in Table 3 shows that the average emigration rate of college
graduates increases by 15.1 percentage points in developing countries (from 11.5 to 26.6
percent). The largest changes are observed in the poorest regions such as sub-Saharan Africa
(+23.1 percentage points) and Middle-East and Northern Africa (+18.9 percentage points).
The effect is smaller in middle-income or emerging regions such as China and India (+11.0
percentage points) and the Commonwealth of Independent States (+12.4 percentage points).
Although we only report long-run changes obtained in the partial equilibrium scenario, very
similar changes in emigration rates are obtained in the short-run or with endogenous TFP.
Columns 2 to 4 give the long-run effects of the shock on income per worker in the
developing world while columns 5 to 7 give the effect on income per natural, defined as
the average income of all native-born adults from a given region, wherever they reside. We
distinguish between three scenarios, the partial equilibrium one with exogenous TFP and
endogenous education choices (‘Bench.’ in Table 3), one with exogenous TFP and constant
higher education investment (‘Cst. educ.’), and one with endogenous TFP and education
levels (‘End. TFP’). The second scenario disregards the incentive effect on higher education
and only accounts for the access-to-education effect. The third scenario supplements the
benchmark with the technology effect.
In the benchmark scenario, the least pessimistic one for developing countries, income per
worker in developing countries decreases by 2.5 percent. The largest effects are obtained in
Middle-East and Northern Africa and in Latin America and the Caribbean. This scenario ac-
counts for the incentive effect, i.e. for the fact that skill-biased emigration prospects increase
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the expected returns to schooling and stimulate ex-ante investments in human capital. We
disregard this effect in the second scenario and obtain similar albeit more pessimistic results.
Hence, endogenizing higher education attenuates the loss for developing countries but does
not reverse the effects. Under a worldwide liberalization of high-skilled migration, the brain
drain shock is too large to generate "net brain gain" effects. This is in line with Beine et al.
(2008) who show that the brain drain induces exponential losses of human capital when the
emigration rate exceeds 10 to 15 percent. Not surprisingly, the adverse effect on income per
worker is magnified under endogenous TFP, as the proportion of college graduates falls in
developing countries.
Table 3: Long-run effect of a global liberalization on developing regions
∆BDa Income per workerb Income per naturalb
Bench. Bench. Cst. educ. End. TFP Bench. Cst. educ. End. TFP
DEV +15.1 -2.5% -3.6% -5.0% 5.3% 3.4% 5.2%
CHIND +11.0 -0.8% -1.5% -1.7% 5.3% 4.1% 5.8%
MENA +18.9 -4.4% -6.2% -9.4% 6.9% 4.2% 7.5%
ASIA +15.9 -1.7% -2.7% -3.3% 3.9% 2.4% 4.2%
LAC +16.3 -2.1% -3.4% -4.3% 2.6% 1.1% 1.8%
SSA +23.1 -0.4% -2.8% -2.5% 12.0% 7.1% 13.0%
CIS +12.4 -0.5% -1.1% -1.8% 7.6% 6.6% 7.7%
Notes: aLong-run deviation in high-skilled emigration rates (brain drain) in percentage point; bLong-run
effects of eliminating visa costs for college graduates on income (per worker or per natural) as percentage of
deviation from the benchmark. "Bench.": benchmark, partial equilibrium model; "Cst. educ.": no effect of
emigration prospects on investment in higher education; "End. TFP": elasticity of wages to the proportion
of college graduates equal to .32. Regions: DEV = all developing countries; CHIND = China and India;
MENA = Middle East and Northern Africa; ASIA = Rest of Asia; LAC = Latin America and Caribbean;
SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa; CIS = Commonwealth of Independent States.
A different picture is obtained when focusing on income per natural. The income gain
experienced by the new migrants exceeds the income loss for those left behind. Income per
natural increases by 3.4 to 5.3 percent in the developing world. The rise is important in sub-
Saharan Africa. Hence, the inequality and poverty implications of a complete liberalization
of high-skilled migration are a priori uncertain. A Pareto-improving situation could be
obtained if new college-educated migrants remitted a large share of the income gain to the
less educated left behind. Such an outcome is however unlikely to be observed because on
average, actual migrants only remit a few percent of their income, and this propensity to
remit could become even smaller as the ratio of emigrant to stayer increases.
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4.3 Effect on the world distribution of income
Finally, this section examines the effect of skill-selective liberalization reforms on the world
economy. Results are depicted on Figure 1.7
Figure 1a shows the impact on the world proportion of migrants while Figure 1b gives
the effect on the world proportion of college graduates, both expressed as percentage point of
deviation from the baseline. In the benchmark, partial equilibrium model, a global liberal-
ization of high-skilled migration increases the world proportion of migrants by 1.5 percentage
points in the short-run and by 2 percentage points in the long-run. The worldwide proportion
of college graduates increases by 0.5 percentage points in the short run and by 1.0 percentage
point in the long-run. This is not negligible as the baseline proportions of college-educated
are equal to 11.2 percent in 2025 and 15.8 percent in 2075. The short-run change in human
capital is entirely due to the incentive effect. Then, new educated adults invest more in the
basic education of their offspring and have fewer children; this gradually increases the pro-
portion of young adults having access to higher education. With exogenous higher-education
decisions, the effect on human capital is negligible and exclusively due to the assimilation
of new migrants in terms of investment in basic education of their children; this slightly
reduces the effect on the world proportion of migrants. With endogenous TFP, the incentive
effect on higher education and the world proportion of migrants are slightly greater as skilled
emigration decreases wages in origin countries and increases them in destination countries.
We now focus on the world distribution of income. The effect on the world average
level of income per capita as percentage of deviation from the baseline (usually referred
to as the efficiency effect) is presented on panel 1c. A skill-selective liberalization of high-
skilled migration increases the worldwide average income per worker by 2.4 percent in the
short-run and by 6.2 percent in the long-run. Comparing the benchmark with the constant
education scenario in partial equilibrium, about 3/4 of the short-run efficiency gain is due to
the reallocation of college-educated workers from low-income to high-income countries and
only 1/4 is due to the incentive effect. Over time, the access-to-education effect gradually
increases the stock of college graduates. With endogenous TFP, the productivity gap between
poor and rich countries increases. Overall, this boosts efficiency gains (+4.0 percent in the
short-run and +8.8 percent in the long-run).
As explained in the previous sections, liberalizing high-skilled migration reduces human
capital and the pre-transfer level of income per worker in developing countries, and increases
them in high-income countries. Figure 1d gives the effect on the Theil index of inequality
7A partial liberalization of college-educated workers’ mobility could also be simulated. As shown in Delogu
et al. (2013), even though the effects are non-linear in the liberalization rate they are almost proportional
to it.
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Figure 1: Effects of skill-selective liberalization of labor mobility on the world economy
(a) Proportion of migrants (b) Proportion of college grad.
(c) GDP per capita (d) Theil inequality index
in percentage point deviation from the baseline. In partial equilibrium, the Theil index
increases by 1.0 percentage points in the short-run and by 1.2 percentage points in the
long-run. The effect is almost identical if higher education decisions are exogenous. On the
contrary, the effect can be magnified by the technology effect: in the short-run, the Theil
index increases by 3.5 percentage points with endogenous TFP. The increased mobility raises
wages in developed (receiving) countries while it decreases the income of stayers in developing
(sending) countries, thereby reinforcing the income gap between poor and rich regions.
5 Conclusion
The race to attract talents is likely to get tougher in the future. In this paper, we use a
unique database on desired migration to quantify the net pool of foreign talents (NPFT) of
the major industrialized countries. We show that the EU15 has a large NPFT, although this
pool is relatively smaller than the US, Canadian or Australian ones. So far, the EU15 has
poorly benefited from it while the US has mobilized a large portion of it. We then use a
15
quantitative theory model to simulate the short-run and long-run impacts of skill-selective
liberalization shocks on the world economy. Overall, a worldwide liberalization of high-
skilled migration benefits high-income countries and adversely affects developing countries.
It reduces the average income gap between the EU15 and the US. However, the European
gains are unevenly distributed: less attractive countries such as Austria, Belgium, Germany,
Greece, Luxembourg and the Netherlands benefit less than the US, Canada or Australia.
In developing countries, skill-biased emigration prospects stimulate the investment in higher
education. However, this incentive mechanism is too small to induce a net brain gain. Human
capital and income per worker thus decrease in developing countries. Still, the income per
natural increases for all the developing regions, highlighting the fact that the increase in
emigrants’ income exceeds the loss of the stayers’. Pareto-improving transfer schemes could
be imagined but would be difficult to implement. Increasing the race to attract talents
increases inequality, especially if total factor productivity varies with human capital.
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1 Analytical description of the model
Our model endogenizes wages, emigration, fertility and (higher and basic) education deci-
sions. We want it to be compatible with some salient stylized facts on emigration and human
capital formation. First, macrodata show large cross-sectional variations in the proportion of
college graduates Hk,t and strong persistence over time in each country. Second, an endoge-
nous share of high-skill and low-skill individuals decides to emigrate to another country but
all emigrants do not choose the same destination. Some migration corridors are empty while
other corridors exhibit bidirectional migration flows. Third, investment in college education
is done under uncertainty about the future place of work: expectations about the size and
structure of migration (i.e. emigration prospects) matter for education. A more detailed
exposition of the model can be found in Delogu et al. (2013).
1.1 Aggregates
We use the following notations for aggregate variables at time t:
• N sk,t ∈ < : number of working-age natives of type s = (h, l) from country k (h for
college graduates and l for the less educated)
∗We acknowledge financial support from the ARC convention on "Geographical Mobility of Factors"
(convention 09/14-019). Corresponding author: Frédéric Docquier, IRES, Collège Léon Dupriez, Place
Montesquieu, 3, bte L2.06.01, B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium (frederic.docquier@uclouvain.be).
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• Nk,t ∈ < : number of working-age natives from country k, computed as (Nhk,t +N lk,t)
• pik,t ∈ [0, 1] : fraction of eligible adults investing in higher (college) education
• Hk,t ∈ [0, 1]: share of college graduates in the native population, computed asNhk,t/(Nhk,t+
N lk,t)
• N skj,t ∈ <: number of type-s emigrants from k to j
• xskj,t ∈ [0, 1] : total effort required to emigrate from k to j (xskk,t = 0)
• ln vsk,t ∈ < : log of the deterministic level of ("inner") utility that can be reached in the
location k by adults of type s
• Lsk,t ∈ [0, 1]: number of working-age (after-migration) residents of type s, computed as
≡ ∑iN sik,t
• hk,t ∈ [0, 1]: share of college graduates in the resident population, computed as
Lhk,t/(Lhk,t + Llk,t)
• psk,t ∈ [0, 1]: skill-specific emigration rate from country k, computed as
∑
i 6=kN ski,t/N
s
k,t
• nsk,t ∈ < : fertility rate of type-s adults residing in country k (we assume nhk,t = 1)
• nk,t ∈ < : average fertility rate in country k, computed as hk,tnhk,t + (1− hk,t)nlk,t
• qsk,t ∈ [0, 1] : proportion of children of a type-s parent receiving basic education (we
assume qhk,t = 1)
• qk,t ∈ [0, 1] : average proportion of children with basic education, computed as:
hk,tn
h
k,t + qlk,t(1− hk,t)nlk,t
nk,t
This variable also represents the proportion of adults who are eligible for higher edu-
cation in the next period.
• wsk,t ∈ < : wage rate in country k for type-s workers
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1.2 Outer (random) utility function
We assume that preferences are represented by a two-level nested utility function. As for
the outer utility function, we use a random utility model with two sources of heterogeneity.
We use it to endogenize higher education (pik,t) and emigration (psk,t) decisions. Working-
age individuals have heterogeneous abilities to acquire higher education, and heterogeneous
preferences over destination countries. The outer utility function has a deterministic and a
random component:
U skj,t = ln vsj,t + ln(1− xskj,t) + ln(1− esk) + εskj (1)
where esk ∈ [0, 1] is the individual-specific effort to be of type s = (h, l) in country k, and
εskj ∈ < is the individual-specific random taste for migrating from k to j.
As standard in the migration literature, we assume that the random component of util-
ity εskj follows a Type I-Extreme Value distribution (also known as the double-exponential
distribution) with a scale parameter µ > 0. As far as the higher education cost is con-
cerned, no effort is required if the individual does not acquire higher education (elk = 0). On
the contrary, investing in higher education requires a positive level of effort (ehk > 0). The
distribution of this effort is affected by parental investments in basic education. For all indi-
viduals who did not receive basic education when young, the effort to get college education
is equal to one (ehk = 1). Given our logarithmic utility function, it is never optimal for them
to acquire higher education. For those who received basic education when young, we have
ehk ∈ ]0, 1[. We assume that the monotonic and increasing transformation of the education
effort, τhk ≡
(
1− ehk
)−1 ∈ [0,∞], follows a Pareto distribution. The country-specific CDF
is given by Gk (τ) = 1 −
[
τk
τ
]α
where τ k > 0 is the lower bound of the distribution of effort
in country k and α > 0 determines the slope of the CDF. Parameter τ k is country-specific
and reflects access to higher education; it is likely to be large in poor countries with low
urbanization rates and low levels of public spending for college education.
The timing of decisions is the following. First, individuals who received basic education
discover their education type (esk,t). They do not know their migration type (εskj,t) but know
its distribution. Given their expectations about vsj,t and xskj,t, they decide whether to acquire
higher education or not. Second, they discover their migration type (εskj,t) and decide whether
to emigrate or to stay in the home country.
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1.3 Higher education decisions
Basic education is a prerequisite for investing in college, but not all eligible individuals find it
optimal to acquire higher education. In the first stage, individuals acquire higher education
if the expected utility gain from being college educated exceeds the effort cost. Under the
Type I Extreme Value distribution, de Palma and Kilani (2007) derived the expression for
the ex-ante expected utility. Using their theorem, the expected utility of choosing type s is
given by
E
(
U skj,t
)
= E
[
ln vsj,t + ln(1− xskj,t) + εskj
]
+ ln(1− esk)
= ln
I∑
i=1
e[ln vsi,t+ln(1−xski,t)]/µ + ln(1− esk,t)
Investing in college education is optimal if E
(
Uhkj,t
)
> E
(
U lkj,t
)
, i.e.
τ ck,t ≤
∑I
i=1(vhi,t)1/µ(1− xhki,t)1/µ∑I
i=1(vli,t)1/µ(1− xlki,t)1/µ
≡ (v
h
k,t)1/µ + (V hk,t)1/µ
(vlk,t)1/µ + (V lk,t)1/µ
(2)
where vsk,t determines the component of expected utility affected by the home country char-
acteristics, and (V sk,t)1/µ ≡
∑
i 6=k(vsi,t)1/µ(1− xski,t)1/µ is the component related to emigration
prospects. The effect of emigration prospects is large if the levels of V sk,t/vsk,t are large. This
is the case if the origin country is poor relative to other countries and if emigration costs
are small. In a closed economy framework (xski,t = 1 ∀s, i 6= k), the critical level of effort
below which college education is beneficial is determined locally (τ ck,t = (vhk,t/vlk,t)1/µ). In an
open economy (i.e. when V sk,t > 0), the expected return to education is clearly affected by
emigration prospects.
Property 1 (incentive effect). Emigration prospects stimulate incentives to acquire higher
education if the expected education premium abroad is greater than in the country of origin
V hk,t
V l
k,t
>
vhk,t
vl
k,t
.
Using (2) and the Pareto distribution, the proportion of college graduates among native
adults is equal to the product of the predetermined proportion of eligible adults who received
basic education (qk,t−1) by the endogenous fraction of them who find it optimal to invest in
higher education (pik,t). We have:
Hk,t ≡ qk,t−1pik,t = qk,t−1
[
1−
(
τ k
(vlk,t)1/µ + (V lk,t)1/µ
(vhk,t)1/µ + (V hk,t)1/µ
)α]
(3)
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It follows:
Property 2 (access-to-education effect). The average responsiveness of investment in col-
lege education to skill-biased emigration prospects depends on past education levels ( qk,t−1)
and access to higher education ( τ k).
The effect of emigration prospects on the proportion of college graduates thus varies
across countries with the lagged enrollment rate in basic education and with access to higher
education (τ k). The latter is likely to depend on the country’s development level, urbaniza-
tion rate, public spending on tertiary education, etc. Below, we will show that the enrollment
rate in basic education depends on the lagged proportion of college graduates (i.e. college-
educated invest more in the education of their children). This explains the strong persistence
in human capital data and implies that a shock in emigration prospects induces gradual ef-
fects on the world economy.
1.4 Emigration decisions
In the second stage, education has been determined and individuals choose to emigrate
to country j if ln vsj,t + ln(1− xskj,t) + εskj exceeds the level attainable in any other location.
Following McFadden (1984), under the Type I Extreme Value distribution, the probability to
emigrate can be expressed as a logit expression. The emigration rate and emigrant-to-stayer
ratio are given by:
N skj,t
N sk,t
= e
[ln vsj,t+ln(1−xskj,t)]/µ∑I
i=1 e
[ln vsi,t+ln(1−xski,t)]/µ
=
(vsj,t)1/µ(1− xskj,t)1/µ∑I
i=1(vsi,t)1/µ(1− xski,t)1/µ
N skj,t
N skk,t
= e
[ln vsj,t+ln(1−xskj,t)]/µ
e[ln vsk,t]/µ
=
(
vsj,t
vsk,t
)1/µ
(1− xskj,t)1/µ (4)
These expressions show that skill-specific emigration rates are endogenous and comprised
between 0 and 1. Equation (4) states that the ratio of emigrants from country k to country
j over the stayers in country k (i.e. agents born in k who remain in k), is an increasing
function of the utility achievable in country j and a decreasing function of the utility in
the country of origin k. The proportion of migrants from k to j also decreases with the
bilateral migration cost xskj,t. Heterogeneity in migration tastes implies that emigrants select
all destinations for which xskj,t < 1. If xskj,t=1, the corridor is empty. All corridors such that
xsjk,t, x
s
kj,t < 1 exhibit bidirectional migration flows. In addition, the aggregate emigration
rate (psk,t) and the ratio of emigration rates (ρk,t) from country k are jointly determined and
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given by the following expressions:
psk,t ≡
∑
i 6=kN ski,t
N sk,t
=
(V sk,t)1/µ
(vsk,t)1/µ + (V sk,t)1/µ
ρk,t ≡
phk,t
plk,t
=
(V hk,t)1/µ
(V lk,t)1/µ
[
(vhk,t)1/µ + (V hk,t)1/µ
(vlk,t)1/µ + (V lk,t)1/µ
]−1
(5)
The ratio of emigration rates increases with V hk,t and decreases with V lk,t. From (3) and
(5), we have sgn
(
∂Hk,t
∂V s
k,t
)
= sgn
(
∂ρk,t
∂V s
k,t
)
and sgn
(
∂Hk,t
∂vs
k,t
)
6= sgn
(
∂ρk,t
∂vs
k,t
)
:
Property 3 (incentive effect). Emigration-driven expected utility shocks (∆V sk,t) induce a
positive correlation between human capital formation (Hk,t) and the ratio of emigration rates
(ρk,t). Local expected utility shocks (∆vsk,t) induce a negative correlation between Hk,t and
ρk,t.
In particular, shocks increasing the expected utility of college graduates abroad (e.g.
greater skill selection in the major destination countries) have a positive effect on human
capital formation (Hk,t) and on the positive selection of emigrants (as reflected by the ratio
of emigration rates ρk,t). Shocks increasing the expected utility of the less educated abroad
have a negative effect on both variables.
1.5 Inner utility function
The inner utility function vsk,t is a Cobb-Douglas function of consumption (csk,t), fertility (nsk,t)
and the proportion of children receiving basic (primary and secondary) education (qsk,t), i.e.
ln vsk,t = (1− θ) ln csk,t + θ lnnsk,t + θλ ln qsk,t,
with (θ, λ) = (.3, .6) in line with the existing quantitative literature on fertility and education.
Raising a child requires a time cost φ and providing a child with basic education induces
paying a monetary education cost which is proportional to the high-skilled wage rate. In poor
countries, we allow non-educated children to work and earn a wage which is proportional to
the low-skilled wage rate.
The utility function is maximized subject to a budget constraint and qsk,t ≤ 1. With a
Cobb-Douglas function, a fraction (1− θ) of the full-time equivalent wage rate is devoted to
consumption: With θ = .3, we have
ln vsk,t = 0.7 lnwsk,t + ln Ωsk,t (6)
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where ln Ωsk,t ≡ θ lnnsk,t+θλ ln qsk,t+(1−θ) ln(1−θ) depends on fertility and basic education
decisions.
Property 4 (access-to-education effect). We assume that the wage ratio between college
graduates and the less educated and the wage ratio between children and low-skilled adults
are exogenous. Basic education costs are proportional to the high-skilled wage rate. Under
this set of hypotheses, skill-specific fertility rates (nsk,t), basic education investments ( qsk,t)
and the residual terms Ωsk,t follow an exogenous time path.
Using the set of hypotheses of Property 4, a migration policy reform only affects dis-
parities in inner utility if wages are endogenous. In addition, relocating people from poor
countries (high fertility and low investment in basic education) to rich countries (low fer-
tility and high investment in basic education) gradually changes the dynamics of the world
population.
1.6 Technology
We assume the following production function:1
Yk,t = Ak,t
[
σkL
h
k,t(1− φnhk,t) + Llk,t(1− φnlk,t)
]
(7)
where Ak,t denotes total factor productivity, σk measures the relative productivity of college
graduates (affecting the skill premium) and (1 − φnsk,t) denotes the labor supply of type-s
adults. Younger workers are employed in the informal sector, the hidden part of the economy.
This production function assumes a perfect substitutability between college graduates
and the less educated. The wage rates for college graduates and the less educated are given
by whk,t = Ak,tσk and wlk,t = Ak,t, respectively. We will consider two scenarios on the level
of total factor productivity. The first assumes that it grows at the same exogenous rate of
1.5 percent per year. This partial equilibrium scenario does not allow for the technology
effect. The second assumes the same exogenous growth rate plus an elasticity of Ak,t to the
share of college graduates in the labor force equal to 0.32 (technology effect). Both scenarios
thus imply a constant wage ratio between high-skilled and low-skilled workers. However,
Delogu et al. (2013) considered a CES technology and showed that liberalizing migration
has a limited impact on the wage ratio between high-skilled and low-skilled workers.
1Assuming that output is proportional to labor, our model has no physical capital. We have in mind
a globalized economy in which physical capital follows people. In addition, we showed in Docquier et al.
(2014) that accounting for imperfect substitution between low-skilled and high-skilled workers or between
immigrants and natives has a negligible impact on the results.
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1.7 Parametrization
The model is calibrated on the year 2000 and the horizon of our simulations is 2075 (one
period represents 25 years).
First, we use cross-country data on the skill structure of the labor force (Artuç et al.,
2014), GDP per capita (World Development Indicators) and returns to schooling (Hendricks,
2004). In all the countries, skill-specific wage rates are calibrated to perfectly match data
on GDP and returns to schooling in the year 2000. For subsequent years, we assume that
the wage rates are growing at the same rate in all the countries (1.5 percent per year) in the
absence of policy reforms. Policy reforms can affect between-country disparities in wages if
total factor productivity is endogenous.
Under the identifying assumptions that nhk,t = qhk,t = 1, we calibrate nlk,t and qlk,t−1 to
perfectly match the average fertility rate (nk,t) and proportion of natives with secondary
education (qk,t−1) in the year t = 2000. This determines ln Ωsk,t in (6). For subsequent
years, nlk,t and qlk are adjusted to match the UN demographic projections. We calibrate
the trajectory of the young workers’ wage rates to match the time path for nlk,t, and the
trajectory of basic education costs to match the time path for qlk,t.
Third, we identify the migration technology. Bertoli et al. (2013) found an elasticity
of bilateral migration to the wage ratio (wsj,t/wsk,t) between 0.6 and 0.7. Plugging (6) into
(4), the elasticity in our model equals 0.7/µ. By choosing µ = 1, the responsiveness of
migration to wage disparities is in line with the empirical literature. We then use the
comprehensive matrices of bilateral migration described in Artuç et al. (2014), who provide
bilateral migration stocks (N skj,t) by education level for all country pairs. We identify (1 −
xskj,t) as a residual of (4). Our calibration strategy thus perfectly fits migration data. In the
benchmark trajectory of the world economy, we assume that migration costs are constant.
Migration costs sum up the legal costs incurred to obtain a visa and the private costs
incurred by migrants to assimilate in the destination country. As in Docquier et al. (2014),
we use the Gallup World Poll survey data on desired migration to identify the magnitude
of private costs (xskj,t). Again, we identify (1 − xskj,t) as a residual of (4) after adding the
skill-specific number of individuals who express a desire to emigrate to the effective migra-
tion stocks. A skill-selective liberalization of immigration to country j means that xhkj,t is
decreased to xhkj,t for all (k, j).
Fourth, decisions about higher education are governed by the Pareto distribution of
education costs. The lower bound of the distribution, parameter τ k > 0, is allowed to vary
across countries, and α > 0 is assumed to be common to all countries. For a given α, τ k is
calibrated so as to match the proportion of college graduates in the labor force of country
k in 2000. We iterate on α to match the elasticity found in the empirical literature on
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brain drain and human capital formation. To conduct this iterative exercise, we simulate a
liberalization of high-skilled migration for all country pairs and select α to have an average
short-run elasticity of the pre-migration proportion of college graduates (Hk,t) to the high-
skilled emigration rate (phk,t) close to .05 in developing countries, as in Beine et al. (2008).
This requires α =.1.2 The model can then be used to simulate the effect of immigration
policy reforms.
2 Gallup data on desired migration
This Appendix describes the macro-database on desired and potential migration used in
the paper. We combine it with the data on effective migration from Artuç et al. (2014),
henceforth referred to as the ADOP database. We rely on the unique and largely under-
studied Gallup World Poll surveys (Gallup, 2010, 2014). They identify the proportion of
non-migrants expressing a desire to emigrate permanently to another country. Gallup also
provides information on the desire to emigrate temporarily but does not document the de-
sired duration of the stay abroad. We only focus on permanent migration in the benchmark
version of the data set. The Gallup survey has been organized on a yearly basis in more
than 150 countries since 2005. It documents individual characteristics (such as age, gen-
der and education). The survey includes two relevant questions on intentions to emigrate
permanently; these questions were asked in only 142 countries:
• Q1 - Ideally, if you had the opportunity, would you like to move permanently to another
country, or would you prefer to continue living in this country?
• Q2 - To which country would you like to move?
In line with the ADOP database, we only consider respondents aged 25 and over, and
distinguish between individuals with college education and the less educated.3 We aggregate
the four first waves of the Gallup survey (i.e. the years 2007 to 2010) and consider that
2In Delogu et al. (2013), the authors use α=.4 in order to match the long-run elasticity around .20 in
Beine et al. (2008). They show in a robustness test that the variation of α has only limited quantitative
effects while qualitatively the results hold.
3The skill structure of the Gallup database is however different from ADOP. The ADOP database defines
a high-skilled individual as anyone who has obtained at least one year of college education. In the Gallup
survey, education obtained by the respondent is classified using the answer to the question: “What is your
highest completed level of education? (Possible answers: Completed elementary education or less (up to
8 years of basic education), Secondary up to 3 year tertiary (9-15 years of education), Completed 4 years
of education beyond high school and/or received a 4-year college degree, Don’t Know, Refused)”. Tertiary
educated individuals are defined as those who reply: “Completed 4 years of education beyond high school
and/or received a 4-year college degree”. Since the propensity to emigrate increases with education, we might
overestimate the desire to migrate of both high-skilled and low-skilled individuals.
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these four waves represent a single period of observation. This allows us to limit the number
of missing cells and increase the accuracy of our estimates. By 2000, these 142 countries
represented 97.4 percent of the worldwide adult population (population aged 25 and over
covered in the 195 countries included in the ADOP database). The survey covers 287,410
respondents, i.e. an average of 2,024 observations per country. In some cases, the num-
ber of respondents is however very small and the raw data needs to be adjusted. Burundi
and Namibia are the two extreme examples: only one college-educated respondent was in-
terviewed and expressed a desire to emigrate; our raw desired emigration rate equals 100
percent in these two cases. We also use imputation methods for the 53 countries included in
the ADOP database but not in the Gallup survey. It is worth noticing that imputed data
accounts for less than 2 percent of the total number of desiring migrants.
Our first step consists of using responses to Q1 to compute the aggregate proportion of
individuals who express a desire to permanently leave their country, whatever their preferred
country of destination. In the second step, we use responses to Q2 to disaggregate the number
of desiring migrants by country of destination.
2.1 Aggregate desired emigration rates
We denote the aggregate proportion of individuals who express a desire to permanently
leave their country by dsiT for individuals of education type s living in country i = 1, ..., I.
To compute desired emigration rates, we aggregate individual responses to Q1 and weight
each observation by the relevant Gallup sample weight. These weights are designed to com-
pensate for the low coverage of certain groups (by gender, race, age, educational attainment,
and region) in the whole population. Gallup assigns a weight to each respondent “so that
the demographic characteristics of the total weighted sample of respondents match the lat-
est estimates of the demographic characteristics of the adult population available” for the
country (Gallup, 2010).
For each origin country i and skill type s, we compute the weighted number of respondents
to Q1 (TR_Q1si ) and the weighted number of respondents who answered positively to the
same question (Y R_Q1si ). Our raw measure of desire to emigrate (d˜siT ) is given by
d˜siT ≡
Y R_Q1si
TR_Q1si
∀i, s (8)
For some origin countries, the total number of respondents is small. To correct for small
sample bias, we constructed an adjusted measure of the desired emigration rate using origin-
and skill-specific reliability rates (ωsi ∈ [0; 1]) and predicted emigration rates (d̂siT ) for each
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country of origin:
dsiT = ωsi d˜siT + (1− ωsi )d̂siT (9)
The reliability rate measures the degree of confidence that we have in the Gallup obser-
vations. For college graduates, we consider that the raw measure of desire to emigrate can
be fully trusted when it is inferred from at least 50 observations representing at least 0.01
percent of the population at origin (denoted by Pophi ). This is the case for 82 countries (out
of 142). For the less educated, the minimal number of observations equals 100 and we use
the same 0.01 percent threshold for the response rate. Given these criteria, the raw measure
of desire to emigrate for the less educated can be fully trusted in 113 cases (out of 142). For
these countries, we have ωsi = 1 and thus dsiT = d˜siT .
For the remaining countries, the reliability rate in (9) is smaller than one and computed
as a geometric mean of the absolute and relative reliability rates:
ωhi =
[
Min
(
1; TR_Q1
h
i
50
)]1/2 [
Min
(
1; TR_Q1
h
i /Pop
h
i
0.0001
)]1/2
(10)
ωli =
[
Min
(
1; TR_Q1
l
i
100
)]1/2 [
Min
(
1; TR_Q1
l
i/Pop
l
i
0.0001
)]1/2
(11)
As for predicted emigration rates (d̂siT ), we estimate a third-order polynomial relationship
between potential emigration rates (i.e. effective + desired) and effective emigration rates.
The rationale is that potential and effective migration stocks are affected by many common
factors (such as pull/push factors and distances), except migration policies and their effect
on the probability of a successful application.
Potential emigration rates are computed using effective emigration rates (msiT ) and raw
emigration rates (d˜siT ):
p˜siT = msiT + (1−msiT )d˜siT
The sample used to estimate the relationship between p˜siT and msiT only includes obser-
vations for which the reliability rate ωsi is greater than a threshold. For the less educated,
our regression sample includes origin countries with at least 50 observations representing at
least 0.0001 percent of the population at origin (i.e. countries with ωli > 0.22); this is the
case for 141 countries for the less educated (out of 142). For college graduates, the minimal
number of observations equals 10 and we use the same relative threshold than for the less
educated. The regression sample for college graduates includes 130 countries (out of 142)
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with ωhi > 0.15. We obtain the following results for predicted potential emigration rates:
p̂hiT = 3.027(mhiT )− 5.494
(
mhiT
)2
+ 3.845
(
mhiT
)3
(N = 130, R2 = 0.936)
p̂liT = 4.893(mliT )− 19.278
(
mliT
)2
+ 23.887
(
mliT
)3
(N = 141, R2 = 0.835)
All estimated coefficients are significant at the 0.1 percent threshold. The R2’s (and F-stats)
of these two regressions are very large.
We can thus compute the predicted desired emigration rates as:
d̂siT =
p̂siT −msiT
1−msiT
The correlation rates between raw and predicted desired emigration rates equal 0.81 for
college graduates and 0.99 for the less educated. However, adjusting the data eliminates some
evident outliers. In most cases, our adjusted measures are slightly smaller than the raw ones.
This is due to the fact that countries with small numbers of respondents and/or response
rates exhibit unusually large desired emigration rates. On the aggregate, our correction
reduces the number of desiring migrants by 42.3 million (i.e. 12.7 percent of the raw total,
equal to 331.9 million), including 8.2 million college graduates and 34.1 million less educated
adults. As far as college graduates are concerned, 48 percent of this adjustment comes from
the United States and 10 percent comes from Italy and Japan, where the relative coverage of
the high-skilled population is small. As for the less educated, 48 percent of the adjustment
comes from China, 10 percent from Brazil and 7 percent from Nigeria.
For the 53 countries that are not available in the Gallup database, we obviously have
ωsi = 0 and thus use dsiT = d̂siT . Desired emigration from these totally imputed countries
only amounts to 6.3 million adults (i.e. 1.9 percent of the total).
2.2 Bilateral structure
In the second step, we use responses to Q2 to disaggregate the number of desiring migrants by
country of destination. We denote by TR_Q2si the education-specific number of individuals
from country i who expressed a desire to emigrate and responded to Q2. R_Q2sij denotes the
number of desiring migrants from country i who declared that country j is their preferred
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destination. A few desiring migrants did not mention a desired destination (i.e. did not
respond to Q2) but this is rarely the case. Out of 142 countries, all respondents to Q1 also
responded to Q2 in 102 countries; and the proportion of respondents to Q2 exceeds 90 percent
in 134 countries. The countries with the smallest response rates to Q2 are Zimbabwe (51.8
percent), Pakistan (56.4 percent) and Australia (67.7 percent). Given these large response
rates to Q2, we ignore those who did not respond to Q2 for the computation of the bilateral
shares. Finally, a few respondents answered to Q2 and mentioned a preferred destination
without responding to Q1. We considered that they responded "Yes" to Q1.
Bilateral matrices of emigration rates are constructed using the following expression:
dsij = dsiT
R_Q2sij
TR_Q2si
Two problems had to be solved for computing the bilateral shares. First, some general
destination categories aggregate several countries and had to be disaggregated by country.
We identified five categories of this sort: "African Countries", "Arab Countries", "Island
Nations", "Other Islamic Countries" and "Other Countries". In most cases, we split the
number of respondents mentioning these categories proportionally to the distribution of
stated desire to emigrate to countries belonging to the same country group.4 A problem
persisted in four cases where no country belonging to the aggregate category was mentioned
as a desired destination. In this case, we use the relative distribution of effective migration
stocks among countries belonging to the aggregate category involved. Example: a few college-
educated Finns mentioned "Other African Countries" as desired destination. These were split
using the effective distribution of high-skilled Finns in African Countries available in the
ADOP database: 12/126 to Ivory Coast and 114/126 to South Africa. After redistributing
these categories, the item "Other Countries" was divided in a similar way using as reference
the relative distribution in desired destinations excluding this category.
The second problem concerns the 53 countries that are not covered in the Gallup survey.
For these cases, the total emigration rates were totally imputed. This group mainly includes
islands and small developing states and represents about 2.6 percent of the world adult
population in 2000, and 1.9 percent of the worldwide potential migration stock. For these
countries, we imputed the bilateral shares of a similar country belonging to the same region,
4Example 1: the number of desired migrants to "African Countries" was divided among the African
destination countries mentioned at least by one respondent as the desired destination. Example 2: 0.43 per-
cent of college-educated respondents from Niger mentioned "Arab Country" as their destination. Four Arab
countries are mentioned explicitly as destination by respondents (weighted numbers between brackets) from
Niger who want to emigrate: Libya (7.34), Morocco (1.13), Saudi Arabia (13.66) and Sudan (0.45). Thus, re-
spondents mentioning "Arab Country" were split between the four countries in proportions 7.34/22.58=0.33,
1.13/22.58=0.05, 13.66/22.58=0.6 and 0.45/22.58=0.02, respectively.
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with a similar level of development and a common colonizer. We used the following matching
pairs:
• the bilateral shares of the Dominican Republic were used for Antigua and Barbuda,
the Bahamas, Barbados, Cuba, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia,
St. Vincent and the Grenadines,
• the bilateral shares of Cambodia were used for Burma (Myanmar) and East Timor,
• the bilateral shares of Djibouti were used for Ethiopia and Somalia,
• the bilateral shares of Guinea were used for the Gambia and Guinea-Bissau,
• the bilateral shares of Guyana were used for Suriname,
• the bilateral shares of Indonesia were used for Brunei,
• the bilateral shares of Italy were used for San Marino,
• the bilateral shares of Haiti were used for Jamaica,
• the bilateral shares of Hong Kong were used for Macao,
• the bilateral shares of Libya were used for Gabon,
• the bilateral shares of Qatar were used for Oman,
• the bilateral shares of Senegal were used for Benin, Bhutan, Republic of Congo, Mau-
ritius, Seychelles and Togo,
• the bilateral shares of Switzerland were used for Liechtenstein,
• the bilateral shares of Spain were used for Andorra,
• the bilateral shares of Zambia were used for Angola, Cape Verde, Equatorial Guinea,
Lesotho, Madagascar, Mozambique, Sao Tome and Principe and Swaziland,
• for Pacific islands (Fiji, Kiribati, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Federated States of Mi-
cronesia, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon islands, Tonga, Tuvalu
and Vanuatu), we assumed one third of desiring migrants want to emigrate to New
Zealand and two-thirds want to emigrate to Australia,
• we assumed nobody wants to leave the Vatican and Monaco.
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